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Local authorities have the third-highest perceived le-
vel of corruption in Croatia, after the judiciary and he-
alth care. Most counties, including the City of Zagreb, 
do not collect their revenues in a timely manner, fail to 
comply with public procurement regulations, and to ma-
nage their public utilities efficiently.
1. Decentralisation and Corruption
Advocates of decentralisation argue that it facilitates 
the satisfaction of the local population’s needs, where-
as the “sceptics” point to many deficiencies of the lo-
cal provision of public services which can obstruct the 
obtaining of the benefits of decentralisation. Particu-
larly interesting is the correlation between decentrali-
sation and corruption, although there are no unequivo-
cal theoretical or empirical findings of this (Fisman and 
Gatti, 2002). Decentralisation can reduce corruption, 
by improving oversight over local officials, because it 
is easier to identify and monitor their personal respon-
sibilities. Naturally, decentralisation should not lead to 
the emergence of numerous new levels of government, 
which would make it much more difficult to determi-
ne direct responsibilities for successes or failures. De-
centralisation can further reduce corruption by encou-
raging competition among local government units. In 
order to attract population, local authorities avoid beha-
viours which are likely to discourage production activi-
ties and employment, and this also includes avoidance 
of corruptive activities. On the other hand, decentrali-
sation can increase corruption, because central govern-
ment jobs are more lucrative than those in the local go-
vernment, so the local government units employ lower-
quality staff. Moreover, decentralisation results in the 
dispersion of decision-making which, given a poor co-
ordination among bureaucrats, can increase the propen-
sity for corruption or manipulation of economic envi-
ronment rather than create value added.
The decentralisation process in Croatia began in 2001, 
as the government transferred part of its powers and res-
ponsibilities relating to the financing of education, heal-
th and social welfare to local government units ready to 
assume them. Since then, little progress has been made 
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towards decentralisation. What is more, Ott (2008:25) 
argues that in Croatia, we can even speak about so-
me sort of centralisation, i.e. further “governmentisa-
tion” of the country, because, given the large number 
of territorial units and inefficient bureaucracy at all le-
vels of government, as well as the existence of the are-
as of special state concern, it is impossible to lessen the 
dominant influence of government bodies on decision 
making. Another important cause of a slow decentrali-
sation progress is a lack of effective supervision at the 
central government level (Maletić, 2008:44). Decentra-
lisation brings more independence and responsibility 
to local authorities, but also requires strict supervision 
and control by the central government. In view of the 
current level of corruption which affects local authori-
ties as well, the idea suggests itself that a slow pace of 
decentralisation can be advantageous. In fact, without 
previously meeting some requirements, centralisation 
might (further) increase arbitrariness of local officials. 
As a result, the alternative to a strong centralised pu-
blic sector would be a weak local government managed 
by only a few members of the local elite. Such a regi-
me would be unattractive to investors and its impact on 
economic growth would be negative.
2.  Corruption at the local government 
level
The Transparency International organisation issues a 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) reflecting the stan-
ces of business people and analysts on the prevalence 
of corruption among government officials and politici-
ans. The index varies from 0 to 10, where 10 is the best 
score signifying a highly “clean” country. The 2008 CPI 
for Croatia is 4.4, the best score since 1999, when it sto-
od at 2.7. However, despite the improvement, the index 
has increased only slightly and at a relatively slow pace. 
As concerns Croatia’s neighbours, the CPI ranges from 
6.7 for Slovenia, 5.1 for Hungary and 4.8 for Italy, to 
3.4 and 3.2 for Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina respectively. Unfortunately, the index do-
es not distinguish between the central and local gover-
nment corruption.
The State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia 
(DORH) has only disclosed total data for all levels of 
government. According to a DORH’s report, there we-
re 611 notifications of criminal offences of corruption, 
of which almost 70% related to power abuse by public 
officials. A year before, the number of reported corrup-
tion-related offences stood at only 138. In 2007, charges 
of bribery, constituting a criminal offence of corruption 
in the narrow sense, were brought against 88 persons, 
(compared to only 50 in 2006). Of the reported 88 ca-
ses, 53 criminal charges were dropped for lack of well-
grounded suspicion. In the remaining cases, investiga-
tion was carried out and 16 persons were indicted and 
8 of them were sentenced to prison. Most of the notifi-
ed cases related to “genuine” bribe-taking1.
According to the DORH’s Report, among those repor-
ted for offences there was a head of division in a muni-
cipality administration, a council member, a city govern-
ment member and a deputy mayor. As indicated by a 
survey (TIH, 2005), over 70% of respondents believed 
corruption was widespread (36%) or very wide spread 
(37%) in the local government sector. Based on this, 
local administration was perceived as the third most 
corrupt sector, outstripped only by the judiciary and he-
alth care. This perception is obviously at variance with 
the number of criminal charges filed, which is probably 
an indicator of citizens’ reluctance to react to corruption 
cases, and of a lack of reliable evidence, as corruption is 
difficult to prove. Maybe, the citizens believe that there 
is no use in filing charges, knowing that the judiciary is 
not only corrupt but inefficient as well.
Concerning local government, the National Anti-Corrup-
tion Programme 2006-2008 (NN 39/06) envisaged the 
following: 
1) monitoring the legality of operations of local servi-
ces; 2) intensifying measures to create special, locali-
ty-specific methods to prevent corruption; 3) amending 
the legislation governing elections to the bodies of lo-
cal government; 4) strengthening the autonomy and res-
ponsibility of local government units in the decentrali-
sation process; and 5) closer monitoring of local funds 
utilisation. The document does not specify how these 
measures would be carried out and what they precisely 
imply. However, some changes have been introduced 
so far concerning item 3), in the form a new Act on the 
Election of Municipality Heads, Mayors, County Pre-
fects and the Mayor of the City of Zagreb (NN 109/07, 
providing that they are elected directly, and the Act on 
the Amendments to the Act on the Procedure for Tran-
sfer of Authority (NN 17/07). Changes have also been 
observed in the area of the closer monitoring of local 
funds utilisation (to be discussed later).
1 “Genuine” bribe-taking is a situation where a perpetrator accepts or requires 
a gift or another benefit in exchange for performing an action within his/
her respective powers which he/she may not perform, or for refraining from 
performing an action he/she is obliged to perform. In contrast to this, “non-
genuine” bribe-taking relates to a case when a person requires or accepts a 
gift or another material benefit for performing a business action he/she is 
normally obliged to perform.
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3. Supervision of local budgets
Transparency of public finance is of crucial importance 
for combating corruption and improving the efficiency 
of public services, as it facilitates control over public 
authorities, which again has a positive impact on their 
responsibility to citizens. Exercising oversight over the 
budget requires transparency of budgetary documents 
and processes, or, to be more precise, timely, reliable 
and accurate data. Or, applied to decentralisation: if the 
government does not have enough information about 
the spending of money transferred to local government 
units, it cannot delegate more responsibility or grant 
more independence to local authorities.
As shown by the State Audit Office reports (2007) for co-
un ties and the City of Zagreb for 2006, as well as their 
budgets, financial documents and financial operations, 
most of these units’ budgets were adopted pursuant to 
the Budget Act, and revenues and expenditures were 
reported in accordance with the Budget Chart of Acco-
unts. Similarly, most local units complied with the or-
ders of the audit issued for the previous year, with the 
following exemptions:
•  certain expenditures were executed in larger-than-pla-
nned amounts;
•  budget revenues were not collected in full and in a ti-
mely manner;
•  irregularities were detected in the record-keeping of 
total assets and liabilities;
•  there were instances of non-compliance with the pu-
blic procurement regulations;
•  part of funds was used for financing current and bud-
getary needs, instead of being allocated for specifi-
ed purposes;
•  the provisions of the Utility Services Act were not 
complied with, and there were often no programmes 
adopted for the construction of utility infrastructure 
facilities and equipment.
Table 1 sums up irregularities established in individual 
counties and in the City of Zagreb, indicating that most 
problems facing the local units relate to compliance wi-
th public procurement regulations, collection of budge-
tary revenues and utility management. Concerning the 
City of Zagreb, irregularities were most pronounced in 
keeping records of expenditures for the procurement of 
non-financial assets, and in reporting non-financial and 
financial assets, whereas the off-balance sheet records 
contained doubtful receivables and contested claims to 
the amount of HRK 467 million. The largest shares in 
this amount were accounted for by receivables for ren-
tals (HRK 304 million) and utility fees (HRK 150 mi-
llion). The report for the City of Zagreb reiterates the 
lack of coordination among the city government bodi-
es, which also includes the non-existence of a unified 
accounting system capable of reducing the probability 
of errors. At this point, it should be noted that the Eu-
ropean Commission (European Commission, 2008, p. 
68), in its Croatia 2008 Progress Report, pointed to li-
ttle progress made in the area of external audit, which 
creates the need to strengthen the legal framework ne-
cessary to achieve independence of the State Audit Of-
fice functions.
In addition to the State Audit Office, the central govern-
ment, i.e. the Ministry of Finance, should also play 
an important role in the local budget oversight. The 
Ministry’s Budget Supervision Division supervises the 
legality, purposefulness and timeliness of budget fund 
utilisation, which also applies to local government units. 
Despite the Division’s activities, Maletić (2008:43) ar-
gues that the central government’s supervisory function 
over the local units’ budgets is not well defined and or-
ganised, and is therefore relatively poor. The legislati-
on is underdeveloped, with inadequate institutional ca-
pacities, human resources and funds, and no desire for 
a real change.
A good thing is the progress achieved with regard to the 
legislation governing internal financial control. Late in 
2006, a new Public Internal Financial Control Act was 
passed (NN 141/06), and a year later, the Government 
adopted separate strategies of development of Public In-
ternal Financial Control for the central government and 
for local government units (Vlada RH, 2007). The stra-
tegy implementation has been entrusted to the Central 
Harmonisation Unit of the Ministry of Finance, and its 
application at the local level is planned by end-2010. A 
new Anti-Corruption Strategy (NN 75/08) is aimed at 
strengthening the current internal and external financi-
al control structures, in order to improve and promote 
the operations of all budget users, the strengthening of 
accountability and transparency of operations of bud-
get users at both central and local levels, and improving 
the legal framework for budget supervision2. In accor-
dance with the Action Plan (Ministarstvo pravosuđa, 
2008), a new Budget Supervision Rulebook has been 
adopted (NN 79/08), prescribing that budget supervisi-
on should no longer be exercised on the basis of adop-
ted plans, but on the basis of petitions submitted by ci-
tizens and the requests of central and local government 
2 Special prominence within the Strategy is given to public procurement, 
bearing a high corruption risk, and in this respect, a number of anti-corrup-
tion goals have been set out.
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bodies or other legal persons, where there is suspicion 
of irregularities or fraud, as well as by order of the Mi-
nister of Finance. The Action Plan also prescribes the 
obligation “to disclose at the Ministry of Finance’s we-
bsite various possibilities to report irregularities, and 
an e-mail address for reporting irregularities relating 
to EU funds or budget funds”. Such an e-mail address 
is really available on the Ministry of Finance’s website 
(www.mfin.hr), but is not conspicuous enough. It can 
be found by following the link “Supervisory activiti-
es”, then “Budget Supervision” and it reads as follows: 
nepravilnosti@mfin.hr. Other possibilities of reporting 
irregularities are not make visible. A positive thing is 
that the Government makes efforts to include citizens 
in the budgetary process. Why is this important? Beca-
use, as taxpayers, citizens contribute to the government 
budget and should therefore be involved in making de-
cisions on the allocation of these funds. Moreover, the 
budget is too important to be left only to government 
officials and parliaments as they are liable to the influ-
ence of various interest groups (Ott, 2008).
Table 1. Main irregularities in local budgets for 2006
Counties Public 
procurement 
Utility
 services
Record-
keeping of 
assets and 
liabilities
Certain 
expenditures
higher than 
planned 
Revenue 
collection
Misalloca-
tion of funds
Total “YES” 
by county
County of 
Bjelovar-Bilogora YES YES YES YES YES YES 6
County of Slavonski 
Brod-Posavina YES NO YES NO YES NO 3
County of Dubrovnik-
Neretva YES YES YES YES YES YES 6
The City of Zagreb YES YES YES YES YES YES 6
County of Istra YES YES NO YES YES NO 4
County of Karlovac YES YES YES NO YES NO 4
County of 
Koprivnica-Križevci YES YES NO YES YES YES 5
County of Krapina-
Zagorje YES YES YES NO YES YES 5
County of Lika-Senj YES NO NO NO YES NO 2
County of Međimurje YES NO YES YES NO NO 3
County of Osijek-
Baranja NO YES NO YES YES YES 4
County of Požega-
Slavonija YES YES YES NO YES YES 5
County of Primorje-
Gorski Kotar YES YES YES YES YES NO 5
County of Sisak-
Moslavina YES NO NO NO YES YES 3
County of Split-
Dalmacija YES YES NO NO YES NO 3
County of Šibenik-Knin YES YES NO NO YES NO 3
County of Varaždin YES YES YES NO YES NO 4
County of Virovitica-
Podravina YES YES YES YES YES YES 6
County of 
Vukovar-Srijem YES NO NO YES YES YES 4
County of Zadar YES YES NO YES NO NO 3
County of Zagreb YES YES YES YES YES YES 6
Total “YES” by 
irregularity 20 16 12 12 19 11
Source: State Audit Office (2007)
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4. The role of citizens
The Open Society Institute’s Local Government and Pu-
blic Service Reform Initiative organised and financed 
a project on budget supervision exercised by non-go-
vernmental organisations and citizens. The results for 
Croatia suggest that the participation of citizens in the 
budget process is inadequate and that they are insuffi-
ciently aware of initiatives to support the local budget 
supervision (Maletić, 2008). The legal prerequisites are 
met, but citizens seem to be passive and poorly orga-
nised. In addition to this, one gets the impression that 
citizens perceive the budget as a “mystical” document 
which is beyond their access.
An increasing number of local government units in Cro-
atia, particularly those that are better-off and more de-
veloped, promote printing and dissemination of guides 
to the budget, and organise public debates (Ott, 2008). 
Despite their efforts, citizens are still insufficiently awa-
re of the need to participate in the budgetary process. 
In most units of local self-government in Croatia, the-
re are public discussions about budget execution, and it 
is examined (mostly through mass media) how satisfi-
ed the public is with the local community programmes 
and services. However, a certain number of units still 
cherish secrecy: financial reports can only be obtained 
at a special request (Maletić, 2008).
How can citizens supervise the budget? Citizens should 
participate in all stages of the budgetary process (Ott, 
2008:31). In the budget preparation phase, they should 
participate in making decisions on programmes. This 
would improve their understanding of the work and go-
als of the local governments. Furthermore, they should 
supervise the execution of the budget and be informed 
about the results. This would reduce the inefficiency of 
public funds utilisation, the incidence of fraud and irre-
gularities. In the financial reporting phase, citizens sho-
uld comment on, request simple reports and compare 
the financial results of their own local units with tho-
se of others. In short, citizens should ask more questi-
ons, communicate with their local units in writing, file 
requests for the improvement of public services, offer 
concrete advice, try to improve their knowledge of the 
budget and promote changes.
In order to be able to comment on local budgets, citizens 
first must have access to them. Local budgets by coun-
ty are available at the Ministry of Finance’s website at: 
http://www.mfin.hr/hr/lokalni-proracun-arhiva, but it is 
questionable how clear they are to the public. The Go-
vernment has started publishing some kind of guides 
to the budget, but not all local government units follow 
this example. The general public should have access to 
clear and understandable financial statements of local 
government units. Local government units are legally 
obliged to publish their budgets, but citizens should also 
be reminded that, for more details, they may invoke the 
Act on the Right of Access to Information (NN 172/03). 
In this respect, it is reasonable to suspect that local au-
thorities would ignore citizens’ inquiries, or that civil 
servants would be hostile towards them. Nevertheless, 
it pays to try and to be persistent. Finally, there is a po-
ssibility to address the mass media which would proba-
bly be interested in a story about, for example “irrespon-
sible spending by a municipality”3. The ways in whi-
ch citizens can directly participate in decision making 
pursuant to the Act on Local and Regional Self-gover-
nment (NN 125/08) are set out in Box 1.
Citizens can also participate through civic organisations. 
It is worth mentioning the result of a survey conducted 
by ten civil society organisations (BURA, 2008), wit-
hin the CARDS project “Civic Society Anti-Corruption 
Response”.4 The survey covered the following towns: 
Čakovec, Karlovac, Osijek, Sisak, Split, Udbina, Vu-
kovar and Zagreb, and dealt with the quality of budge-
tary reporting, as well as the transparency and credibi-
lity of public procurement data. It was concluded that, 
at the local level, public procurement still remains a 
“grey zone” of management, showing serious irregulari-
ties, as also confirmed by the findings of the State Audit 
Office. Concerning budgetary spending, the analysts fo-
cused on the item “other”, for 2006. The most critical 
results were recorded for Vukovar, Zagreb and Split. 
Vukovar reported almost 40% of its expenditures un-
der the item “other”, without an adequate argumentati-
on, whereas Zagreb reported about 17% of its city bud-
get or over HRK 1 billion under the item “other”. Most 
of these funds were spent on the category “other con-
struction projects”. A cause for concern is the fact that 
analysts trying to collect data in the field are sometimes 
blackmailed and threatened by local authorities.
3 The question is, of course, how independent the media can be, if they are 
owned by local authorities, as is often the case. Even in the case of pri-
vately owned media, there may be a certain financial relationship with the 
local authorities, which can influence the degree of self-censorship in mass 
media.
4 The memebers of BURA are: Autonomous Centre (Čakovec), Dalma-
tian Solidarity Committee (Split), Partnership for Social Development 
(Zagreb), Initiator (Korenica), Civil Rights Project (Sisak), Association 
ZORA (Čakovec), Association for Development of Civil Society And Pro-
motion of Women’s Rights DOMINE (Split), Women’s Association (Vuk-
ovar), Women’s Group KORAK  (Karlovac), and Women’s Association 
IZVOR (Tenja).
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Conclusion
In Croatia, nominal decentralisation is taking place in 
parallel with the fight against corruption, with very lit-
tle and slow progress made in both areas. The very se-
rious publicly perceived levels of corruption of local 
authorities and inadequate supervision of local budgets 
lead to a conclusion that the slow pace of decentralisa-
tion is actually a good thing. This is corroborated by the 
fact that a large majority of counties, including also the 
City of Zagreb, fail to collect their revenues in full and 
in a timely manner, do not comply with the public pro-
curement regulations and report serious irregularities 
in their public utility management. Moreover, in some 
units certain expenditures exceed the planned amounts, 
Box 1.  Citizens’ participation pursuant to the Act 
on Local and Regional Self-government  
“Citizens may directly participate in taking decisions on 
local government activities through referenda and local ci-
tizens’ meetings. A referendum can be called for the pur-
pose of deciding on a proposal to amend the statute, on a 
proposal for a general bylaw or another issue from the re-
presentative body’s scope of activities, as well as on ot-
her issues determined by the law and statute. Pursuant to 
the provisions of the law and statute, a referendum shall 
be called by the representative body at the proposal of one 
third of its members, at the proposal of a municipality he-
ad, a mayor or a county prefect, and, in a municipality or 
a town, at the proposal of half of the local committees in 
the territory of the municipality or town, or at the propo-
sal of 20% of the voters registered on the electoral list of 
the municipality or town. Citizens shall have the right to 
propose to a representative body to pass a certain bylaw or 
to resolve a certain issue from its scope of activities. The 
representative body must discuss such proposals, provi-
ded that they are endorsed by signatures of at least 10% or 
voters registered on the electoral list of a municipality, or 
town or county, and send replies to the submitters no later 
than three months following the receipt of a proposal. The 
bodies of local and regional self-government shall enable 
citizens and legal entities to file petitions and complaints 
about their work and the work of their administrative bo-
dies, and about the incorrect behaviour of the employees 
of these bodies when they apply to them for the realization 
of their rights and interests or fulfilling their civic duties. 
The head of the body of a local self-government unit, or 
of an administrative body of this unit shall reply to the fi-
led petitions or complaints no later than 30 days following 
the date of filing a petition or complaint.”
Source: NN 125/08*
* Translated from Croatian, t.n.
part of funds is used for financing current and budge-
tary needs, instead of being allocated for specified pur-
poses, and there are irregularities in keeping records of 
assets and liabilities.
In addition to continuing efforts in the area of gover-
nment administration reforms, aimed at, particularly, 
depolitisation, avoiding conflicts of interest, and em-
ployment based on competence, it is necessary to str-
engthen the external audit and internal control mechani-
sms, and, most of all, to encourage citizens’ active par-
ticipation in the supervision. Without this, giving mo-
re independence and responsibility to local authorities 
would increase the arbitrariness and corruption of local 
government officials. A weak local government mana-
ged by only a few members of the local elite is a poor 
alternative to a large, centralised public sector.
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